Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1971

Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV
Victor P. Goldberg
Columbia Law School, vpg@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Law
and Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Victor P. Goldberg, Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV, 14 J. L. & ECON. 513 (1971).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2267

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

MARGINAL COST PRICING, INVESTMENT
THEORY AND CATV: COMMENT
VICTOR GOLDBERG
Universityof California,Davis

N his article, Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV, James
Ohls' makes a number of erroneousassertions concerningthe optimumpricing
of CATV. Most of his problems stem from a failure to properly define the
environment in which the optimum price is to be set and the role that an
optimum price should play. If one alters Ohls' implicit (and sometimes contradictory)2 assumptions and if one keeps in mind the purpose prices should
serve in an economic system, a number of Ohls' conclusions are altered.

I
Ohls states: ". .. once the programs have been created and sent over a
system with channels and programsfixed, the marginal cost of having an additional subscriber tuned into them is zero. Hence, in a completely optimal
world, actual viewing time would be priced at zero."3 This is true only if a
completely optimal world is one in which consumertastes are revealed without
cost to producers. The appropriate type and amount of resources could then
be allocated to the production of the desired mix of television shows without
the guidance of a price system. But in such a completely optimal regime it
would seem unnecessary to set any prices. The optimal mix of resources
could be guided to the CATV industry, or for that matter to the cat food
industry, by the same omniscient allocator.
In fact, as Minasian4 demonstratedin an earlier discussion of the pricing
of over-the-air television, charging a zero price for a television signal on the
1James C. Ohls, Marginal Cost Pricing, Investment Theory and CATV, 13 J. Law &
Econ. 439 (1970).
2 For example, he seems to assume that
using the price system is costless but then
states that one of the variable costs is the cost of billing.
3 James C. Ohls, supra note 1, at 441.
4 Jora R. Minasian, Television Pricing and the Theory of Public Goods, 7 J. Law &
Econ. 71 (1964). See also Roland N. McKean & Jora R. Minasian, On Achieving Pareto
Optimality: Regardless of Cost!, 5 West. Econ. J. 14 (1966) and Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1969).
513

This content downloaded from 128.059.178.073 on September 27, 2018 10:04:39 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

514

THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

grounds that it has already been produced is not an optimal pricing policy.
Producerscharginga price (assuming exclusion of non-payersis feasible) will
receive profit and loss signals which can convey information concerning the
type of programsdesired by consumersand concerningwhether more or fewer
resourcesshould be allocated to television production.
Ohls' optimal pricing system offers the consumera choice of buying or not
buying a one-month block of potential television viewing.5 Certainly, if
pricing systems are nearly costless to administer, the consumerwill be worse
off if this unnecessaryindivisibility is imposed upon him. If the costs of using
the market system were such as to make it less expensive to proffer this "tied
good" to the consumer, then efficiency might entail producing the cheaper
(but less desirable) tied good. But this choice is by no means a foregone
conclusion as Ohls suggests.
In a world of incomplete information, high transaction costs and high exclusion costs the proper pricing policy for a CATV owner is to offer that mix
of services and prices that maximizes expected profits. He can offer his potential customers some combination of channel capacity, programmingvariety,
picture quality, service quality, and provision for equitable treatment of
customers.6Prices could consist of a lump sum payment, a monthly payment,
a per channel payment, or a per show payment (or some combination of
these).' It is not possible to say, a priori, which of these would be most
efficient. Competitionin either the product market itself or in bidding for the
privilege of running a monopoly system8 should establish which of these best
balances the costs of transactionsand exclusion with the gains in information
and divisibility. It should be clear that the preferred mix will not be the
same for all markets.
Ohls is not clear as to the nature of the CATV system he analyzes. However, the following characterizationwould appear to be most consistent with
5Ohls' optimal pricing scheme requires that the customer pay an initial fee for attaching to the system and a monthly fee to cover marginal costs. He includes in marginal
costs a monthly cost of billing customers. Thus, pricing is not costless in his model. Yet
he in no way justifies the implicit assumption that such billing is less costly than a
lump sum payment or any other of the myriad pricing schemes available.
6 This could include such problems as establishing equity between those who join the
system initially and those who join later. It also includes provisions which would safeguard customers against low initial prices and subsequent high prices when the consumer is "locked in."
7 If the CATV operator can initiate advertising, this opens up another possible price
variable to either be combined with those listed in the text or, perhaps, to supersede them.
8Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. Law & Econ. 55 (1968) suggests
that if there is competition for the privilege of being the sole producer in a certain field,
then competitive prices could be achieved. The ability of local governments to bargain
with cable operators might not be up to the task of protecting consumers. See Ralph
Lee Smith, The Wired Nation, 210 Nation 588 (1970).
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his argument. The CATV station is a passive conveyor of network originated
shows; its market is so small that changes in preferences of viewers within
this market would not influence the programmingmenu offered by the network. In this case the information content of program by program pricing is
minimal and the basic objection to Ohls' monthly pricing would disappearalthough there is still no reason to call the policy optimal. Such a characterization would describe CATV in its early years. It is no longer adequate
today. It is now technologically and economically feasible for cable operators
to enter large urban markets, to form cable networks, or to originate programs. Consequently, the information feedback of the price system is more
valuable and program-by-programpricing is more likely to be useful-if cable
operators are legally permitted to engage in these activities. The fact that
these activities might be illegal should not influence the analysis. Ohls is
trying, after all, to determinewhat the rules should be.
II
In his discussion of a rule for allocating space on a common carrier channel,9 Ohls purports to demonstrate that allocating the space to the highest
bidder is not necessarily the optimal rule.
This is true becauseof the fact that the welfaregains accruingfrom the common
carrierserviceaccruenot only to those who use the service,but also to those who
subscribeto the system. Sellingthe commoncarrierservice to the highest bidder
will maximizeonly the welfarewhich accruesto the buyers-the politiciansusing
it for politicalmessages.It will do this by ensuringthat the personwho needs the
commoncarrierservice the most-and is willingto pay the highestprice for itdoes in fact get it. But anotherpotentialcommoncarrierservicebuyer-perhaps a
civic associationwhich wanted to use the CATV system to telecast a concertmight providemore welfareto the subscribersof the CATVsystem. This welfare
gain is not captureddirectlyby the highestbidderrule.'0
This suggests a question. If consumer welfare resulting from the concert
is greater, why cannot the producersof the concert make a higher bid for the
time slot? This Ohls fails to answer, but the answer would appear to be that
for some unspecified reason the civic association cannot be compensated for
providing the concert. If, in fact, some malfunction of the market mechanism11
9 A common carrier sells time (or entire channels) to program originators. As a special
case of the common carrier problem Ohls analyzes the situation in which one of the
bidders for the open channel is a Pay-TV operator (perhaps even the cable owner himself). Ohls fails to explain how optimality is possible with a Pay-TV channel given his
earlier statement that ". .. in a completely optimal world, actual viewing time would
be priced at zero." James C. Ohls, supra note 1, at 441.
ToId. at 452.
1 It would not be difficult for the civic center to receive payment for providing the
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prohibits one set of bidders from registering bids that reflect the value of
the space to society it is true that the "highest bidder" system will fail to
allocate the space appropriately. But it is unclear as to why Ohls would
regardsuch incorrectpricing as an inexorablelaw of nature.
Ohls' welfare function for the common carrier problem is also subject to
where TR is total revenue, S is consumer's
question. He uses W=TR+S-C,
surplus, and C is total costs.12 The consumer'ssurplus depends, however, on
the shape of the demand curve. He derives his demand curve "by asking
potential consumersat what monthly price they would hook onto the system
knowing that they also had to pay a given hookup price."'" But such a demand curve will not show the maximumsurplus available to consumers.If the
price system is nearly costless to administerconsumerswill be able to achieve
greater levels of welfare by paying on a program-by-programbasis. And if
the pricing system is costly to administer the firm should follow the profit
maximizing pricing policy described above. Ohls' demand curve is, therefore,
simply a special case; if, for example, collection costs were extremely high
the firm's optimal policy might be to charge only an initial fee and the relevant consumer'ssurplus would be derived from this demand curve. In short,
there is no good reason for Ohls' demand curve to be of any interest to the
CATV owners and no reason for policy makers to concern themselves with
the area under it.
broadcast either with advertising revenues, Pay-TV, or contributions. Intervention might
be justified on grounds other than efficiency; Ohls, however, rules this out, id. at 439,
so it will not be considered further here.
12 Id. at 440.
13 Id. at 446.
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